

Meeting No. 1276

4 February 75

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
DRAFT WATCH REPORT
for
WATCH COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

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NSA, DIA reviews completed

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NIC DRAFT WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

No. 1276

4 February 1975

1 The Committee concludes that there will be
2 no military attack on the United States or
3 its overseas forces in the near future.
4 Subjects of immediate concern are discussed
5 below.

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6
7 I. Middle East

8 1. Although a renewal of large-scale fighting in the
9 Middle East could occur with little warning, we believe
10 that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis will initiate
11 hostilities in the immediate future. Both sides appar-
12 ently remain willing to continue diplomatic efforts to
13 reach some accommodation. Soviet Foreign Minister
14 Gromyko's trip to the Middle East is not expected to
15 reconcile Soviet-Egyptian differences or to result in
16 major new Soviet arms aid, but the long-delayed deliv-
17 eries of Soviet aircraft under previous contracts are
18 now probably under way.

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19 II. USSR-Eastern Europe

20 2. We see no indications of hostile intent in the
21 military activity of the USSR or other Warsaw Pact
22 nations,

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25 III. Southeast Asia

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26 [REDACTED]
27 [REDACTED]
28 [REDACTED]
29 [REDACTED]
30 [REDACTED] a buildup would significantly
31 increase Communist capabilities to launch major attacks later
32 in the spring. In the meantime, we expect some heavy fight-
33 ing around Tet, which begins on 11 February. [REDACTED]

34 4. In Cambodia, Communist forces are apparently entering
35 the second phase of their offensive, and increased shelling 25X1
36 of Phnom Penh and Pochentong airfield is expected. Con-
37 currently, efforts to interdict the Mekong River will con-
38 tinue, and increased use of mines is expected. Although
39 attacks against outlying provincial capitals will occupy
40 government forces in those areas, we expect that the govern- 25X1
41 ment will successfully defend Phnom Penh and that the capital
42 will continue to be supplied with essential materiel. [REDACTED]

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4 February 1975

BACKUPI. Middle EastISRAEL - ARAB STATES

1a. In hope of achieving some territorial adjustment in the Sinai and significant political commitments during Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming visit to the Middle East, Cairo and Tel Aviv are reevaluating their negotiating options. Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's cabinet continues to be plagued by divisions centering on his approach to Middle East peace issues. The differences are underscored by Defense Minister Peres' recent statements calling for more stringent terms for an interim settlement with Egypt. The conservatives have accused Foreign Minister Allon of offering too much territory in the Sinai in return for too little in the way of Egyptian political concessions. Peres maintains that Tel Aviv cannot, under present circumstances, give up either the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes or the Abu Rudays oil fields as demanded by the Egyptians. [REDACTED]

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1b. In a 2 February statement in Cairo, President Sadat warned that the danger of war still exists in the Middle East and that the situation is like a time bomb that can explode any time, either deliberately should Israel wage what it calls a preventive war, or through miscalculation. He stressed that neither Egypt nor Syria is preparing for an offensive, but that the Arabs are quite prepared to counter any attack launched by Israel whether on the Syrian or Egyptian front. In Sadat's opinion, Israel is trying to drive a wedge into the unified Arab stance and divide them by insisting on separate solutions for each front. Referring to Kissinger's impending visit, Sadat affirmed his interest in continuing the step-by-step approach in an attempt to achieve something before going to Geneva. Sadat cautioned, however, that "I insist that this something be withdrawal on the three fronts -- Sinai, the Golan, and the West Bank -- to defuse the present explosive situation in the area." [REDACTED]

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4 February 1975

BACKUP

I. Middle East (continued)

1d. The situation on the Lebanese-Israeli border has been very quiet since about 18 January when Israeli-fedayeen fighting in southeastern Lebanon tapered off. Reportedly, the Lebanese have asked the Israelis to extend indefinitely the five-day truce in the Kafr Shuba area which expired on 3 February.

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The low level of border incidents during the past several weeks may be the result of a deliberate effort on the part of the PLO to keep Israeli-fedayeen clashes to a minimum prior to and during the forthcoming Arab Defense Council meeting scheduled to start on 5 February. It may be the PLO's hope to take the edge off any possible attempt by Beirut to raise the question of continued fedayeen presence in southern Lebanon. The Council will be attended by Arab foreign and defense ministers, and the primary agenda item is to discuss what they regard as "the escalating Israeli aggressions against Lebanon."

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SOVIET REACTIONS

1e. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko is now visiting the Middle East, on what appears to have been a hastily arranged trip to sound out the situation in advance of Secretary Kissinger's trip. He will probably make some effort to improve Egyptian-Soviet relations, but there are no signs that their differences will be reconciled. On his arrival in Cairo on 3 February, Gromyko met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy and the two signed previously negotiated consular and economic planning agreements and a cultural protocol. These may prove to be the only result of Gromyko's visit to Egypt. Gromyko's preceding visit to Damascus from 1-3 February was marked by warm expressions of friendship and praise for the Syrians, and the closing communique called for the reconvening of the Geneva peace conference within a month. In Damascus, Gromyko also signed previously negotiated agreements on economic and scientific cooperation and delivered a personal message from Brezhnev to President Asad, but there has been no announcement of any new military or economic agreements.

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BACKUP

Cyprus-Greece-Turkey

The inter-communal talks between Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides and Turkish Cypriot negotiator Denktash have been taking place twice a week, but have not arrived at any agreement on the major issues. President Makarios has blamed the lack of progress on Turkish intransigence and has said that the stalemate should not be allowed to continue. The Archbishop has undertaken a campaign to convince the Greek Cypriots that there is no chance of reaching a decision acceptable to them under the present system, and he is inclined to turn to another forum if the talks do not make some progress by the end of February. He further hinted that he may seek greater Soviet support and involvement in the Cyprus problem. Makarios has bitterly attacked the US Secretary of State and has said that the hardening of the Turkish position in negotiations is due to the fact that Kissinger favors the continuation of US military aid to Turkey. A massive demonstration against the US Embassy in Nicosia is planned on or about 5 February if US military aid to Turkey is not cut off.

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The Turkish alert, which had been imposed because of the Greek Cypriot demonstrations in reaction to the British evacuation of Turkish Cypriot refugees, has been lifted except in the forward elements of the 1st Army in Turkish Thrace.

The cease-fire on Cyprus was broken on 1 February when Greek Cypriot National Guards and Turkish Army troops exchanged gun fire along the "Green Line." The UN Peace Force intervened and arranged a truce after an hour of fighting. Heavy rains made it impossible for the UNFICYP to determine which side started the fighting. Incidents of this kind are likely to recur.

The expected cessation of US military aid could cause problems for the Turkish government. Most of the Turkish military feel that the US assistance is essential to the maintenance of an effective military force and might demand that the government make concessions to insure the continuation of the flow of this equipment. A failure on the part of the caretaker government to accede to the wishes of the military could result in a political confrontation and possibly a military coup.

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In the Aegean Sea, the Turks have announced that the Norwegian seismological research ship, LONGVA, will carry out research work in undisputed areas as directed by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation. We believe that the Turks will avoid any activity which could lead to a confrontation.

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No. 1276

5 February 1975

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2 no military attack on the United States or
3 its overseas forces in the near future.

4 Subjects of immediate concern are discussed
5 below.

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DRAFT - Para 1

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9 Middle East could occur with little warning, we believe
10 that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis will initiate
11 hostilities in the immediate future. Both sides appar-
12 ently remain willing to continue diplomatic efforts to
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15 reconcile Soviet-Egyptian differences or to result in
16 major new Soviet arms aid, but the long-delayed deliv-
17 eries of Soviet aircraft under previous contracts are
18 now probably under way.

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DRAFT - Para 2

19 II. USSR-Eastern Europe

20 2. We see no indications of hostile intent in the
21 military activity of the USSR or other Warsaw Pact
22 nations, [REDACTED]

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DRAFT - Para 4 - Southeast Asia

34 4. In Cambodia, Communist forces are apparently entering
35 the second phase of their offensive, and increased shelling
36 of Phnom Penh and Pochentong airfield is expected. Con-
37 currently, efforts to interdict the Mekong River will con-
38 tinue, and increased use of mines is expected. Although
39 attacks against outlying provincial capitals will occupy
40 government forces in those areas, we expect that the govern-
41 ment will successfully defend Phnom Penh and that the capital
42 will continue to be supplied with essential materiel.

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PROPOSED REVISIONS

CIA 34-36 Revise first sentence: In Cambodia, Communist forces are ap-
parently trying to launch a second round of attacks in the
Phnom Penh area, and increased shelling of Phnom Penh and the
Pochentong airfield is expected.

CIA 38-42 Delete last sentence

DIA - Revise para: In Cambodia, Communist forces are trying to
launch a second round of attacks in the capital area, and
increased shelling of Phnom Penh and Pochentong airfield
is expected. We believe that recent Communist employment
of mines in the Mekong poses a significant threat to river
convoys. Unless some way is found to neutralize these mines,
or clear the banks, government efforts to keep the Mekong
open will likely fail.

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